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I know that I typically write about basic tenets of family law in the majority of my posts but this post is going to be a bit different.  I wanted to talk about how it feels or how it can feel to be divorced and alone.  Obviously, this experience is different for everyone and at the same time, the experience is the same.   It can be very difficult to search for relationships.  It can be even more difficult to be in them.  Generally, we have our damage arising from the things that injured us in our marriage and our divorce.   We have our needs arising from our childhood and other relationships.  It can feel an impossibility to believe that our needs can be met.

I wish that I had a panacea for everyone.  I wish that in this blog I could give you the essence of wisdom so that you can navigate your lives.   I can make some suggestions though and hopefully they help you.

Know who you are.  If you don’t know who you are then you can’t figure out what you want in a relationship.  What I mean is that we desire love so powerfully that we tend to let who we are be subsumed by the needs of their relationship and we stop doing the things that make us who we are.  We give up exercising, hobbies and interests in the service of a relationship and these well meaning sacrifices compromise who we are.  We lose ourselves in the pursuit of love.  This is not to say that compromises are not a necessity in relationships – but have a boundary.

Know what it is that you want in a relationship.  Have an idea what you need.  Unmet needs and expectations are the heart of all suffering in relationships.  If you want someone who values responding to texts, make this clear.  If you want time to exercise, make this clear.  If you need someone that mothers you or fathers you – know you need that and don’t be afraid to find it.  Don’t be afraid to look for and ask for what you need.   If your needs are not met, you can not be happy in the relationship.

Value your children if you have them.  If you do not value your children or you value your relationships over them, then you need to revisit your priorities.

Do not be afraid to be alone.  This is the very hardest thing to achieve.  We all want love.  We all want to hold someone and be held.  Even the strongest most internally driven person needs love and support.

But do not let fear rule you.   Do not make decisions based upon fear of loneliness.   This is not easy and sometimes it is the hardest thing in the world to admit to yourself that you are not in a place that allows you to be in a relationship.   Loneliness is no joke – but sometimes it helps us find ourselves and take care of ourselves.

Good Luck.   I leave you with a Morrisey song that is somewhat apropos.

 

 

Flagrant violations of Custody Orders apparently mandate some form of consequence according to the Superior Court based upon the recent Decision in N.A.M. v. M.P.W., 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 599, *1, 2017 PA Super 254, 2017 PA Super 254 (2017).

In N.A.M., the Court confronted a very contentious custody situation with numerous custody actions.  Father filed a Petition for Contempt on May 2, 2016. In the Petition for Contempt, Father argued that Mother (1) refused to take the children to a Hebrew school Seder in celebration of Passover on April 19, 2016, (2) interfered with the children’s education by preventing the Father from attending a student led parent-teacher conference (3) interfered with Father’s custody at activities, namely the children’s baseball game on April 16, 2016 and (4) interfered with Father’s custody by having her parents pickup at the end of a school day and deliver her to Father’s house in lieu of her using the school bus for the trip, which technically took place during Father’s custodial period which began at the beginning of the school day.

The Court reviewed the testimony presented by the Father and Mother and concluded that the Mother was indeed in contempt of Court Orders.   However, the Court refused to provide further custody to the father in consequence of the Mother’s repeated violations of Court Orders.   The father appealed to the Superior Court indicating that the Court’s failure to impose consequences was violative of case law and social policy.  The Court recognized that the Mother was in violation of the Orders but simply admonished her.

However, the N.A.M. Court stated: “What is abundantly clear from the review of the record in this case is that both Mother and Father have been in contentious litigation in this matter for ten years. As cogently stated by the trial court, neither party is without blame for the stress that the parents’ actions in the custody battle has placed on the Children. Although we understand the trial court’s concern that a sanction by way of reduced custody would be detrimental to the Children, no sanction at all for Mother’s repeated and flagrant abuse of the orders of the trial court is unacceptable under Harcar v. Harcar, 982 A.2d 1230 (Pa.Super. 2009)  N.A.M. v. M.P.W., 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 599, *9, 2017 PA Super 254  Therefore, we are constrained to remand for imposition of sanctions without resolution of any other issue raised by Father. “ N.A.M. v. M.P.W., 2017 Pa. Super. LEXIS 599, *12-13, 2017 PA Super 254 (2017).

The takeaway here is that if a parent repeatedly violates custody orders there will be consequences which can include revision of legal and physical custody.  Do not violate custody Orders.

This case is a primary example of one of the reasons I have created this blog.  At least one of these parents has apparently allowed their anger and resentment to overcome their common sense.  Being the better person and putting your children first has both positive moral and legal consequences.  Consider controlling yourself.

An action for termination of parental rights can be instituted by a public agency like the Department of Human Services or by the other spouse or parent.  The statutory basis are as follows per 23 P.S. §2511:

• (a)  General rule. — The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
  • (1)  The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
  • (2)  The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
  • (3)  The parent is the presumptive but not the natural father of the child.
  • (4)  The child is in the custody of an agency, having been found under such circumstances that the identity or whereabouts of the parent is unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent search and the parent does not claim the child within three months after the child is found.
  • (5)  The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
  • (6)  In the case of a newborn child, the parent knows or has reason to know of the child’s birth, does not reside with the child, has not married the child’s other parent, has failed for a period of four months immediately preceding the filing of the petition to make reasonable efforts to maintain substantial and continuing contact with the child and has failed during the same four-month period to provide substantial financial support for the child.
  • (7)  The parent is the father of a child conceived as a result of a rape or incest.
  • (8)  The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
  • (9)  The parent has been convicted of one of the following in which the victim was a child of the parent:
    • (i)  an offense under 18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 25 (relating to criminal homicide);
    • (ii)  a felony under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702 (relating to aggravated assault);
    • (iii)  an offense in another jurisdiction equivalent to an offense in subparagraph (i) or (ii); or
    • (iv)  an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit an offense in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii).
  • (10)  The parent has been found by a court of competent jurisdiction to have committed sexual abuse against the child or another child of the parent based on a judicial adjudication as set forth in paragraph (1)(i), (ii), (iii) or (iv) or (4) of the definition of “founded report” in section 6303(a) (relating to definitions) where the judicial adjudication is based on a finding of “sexual abuse or exploitation” as defined in section 6303(a).
  • (11)  The parent is required to register as a sexual offender under 42 Pa.C.S. Ch. 97 Subch. H (relating to registration of sexual offenders) or to register with a sexual offender registry in another jurisdiction or foreign country.

• (b)  Other considerations. — The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

• (c)  Right to file personal and medical history information. — At the time the decree of termination is transmitted to the parent whose rights have been terminated, the court shall advise the parent, in writing, of his or her continuing right to place and update personal and medical history information, whether or not the medical condition is in existence or discoverable at the time of adoption, on file with the court and with the Department of Public Welfare pursuant to Subchapter B of Chapter 29 (relating to records and access to information).

 

 

Equitable reimbursement is a concept that can be used in equitable distribution of marital assets. Equitable reimbursement is a method of compensating a spouse for his or her contribution to the marriage where the marital assets are insufficient to do so.

In Bold v. Bold, 524 Pa. 487, 574 A.2d 552 (1990), our Supreme Court found the doctrine of equitable reimbursement properly was applied where wife supported husband financially, annually contributing more than three times the amount husband contributed, for the first five years of the marriage while husband completed his postgraduate degree. Husband’s attainment of that degree resulted in a substantial increase in his earning capacity. Less than two years after husband graduated with a degree in chiropractics, he asked wife to move out. The Court held that separate and apart from the equitable distribution of marital property, consistent with fairness, the supporting spouse in a case such as this should be awarded equitable reimbursement…. In Bold, there was insufficient marital property to compensate wife for her financial contributions to the marriage.  Basically, Bold stands for the proposition that a spouse can get something for their sacrifices during the marriage in support of the other spouse. 

Several cases stand for this proposition including, Zullo v. Zullo, 531 Pa. 377, 380, 613 A.2d 544, 545 (1992); Wagoner v. Wagoner, 538 Pa. 265, 271, 648 A.2d 299, 302 (1994) (summarizing, “at dissolution each marriage [i.e., those at issue in Bold and Zullo] possessed insufficient assets to repay the wife’s sacrifice which had added so significantly to the husband’s future financial status. Thus, in addition to equitable distribution, the wife in each case, for her efforts, was awarded payments, termed equitable reimbursement, in order to equalize the result.”); Twilla v. Twilla, 445 Pa. Super. 86, 664 A.2d 1020 (1995) (applying equitable reimbursement principle to compensate wife for lost equity in marital home due to husband’s failure to maintain mortgage payments where there was insufficient marital property from which to fashion sufficient equitable distribution award); Joanne Ross Wilder, Pennsylvania Family Law Prac. & Proc. (West 2005), § 22-13 (2002) (noting “equitable reimbursement may also be available [in the context of professional degrees, licenses and practices] where alimony is not appropriate but where fairness dictates an award of some sort.”). Thus, it is clear that equitable reimbursement is nothing more than a method of compensating a spouse for that which is fairly due to him or her.

Relevant factors in fashioning an equitable distribution or reimbursement award are set forth at 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 3502(a).  Dalrymple v. Kilishek, 2007 PA Super 83, 920 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa. Super. 2007). Those factors are:

(1) The length of the marriage.

(2) Any prior marriage of either party.

(3) The age, health, station, amount and sources of income, vocational skills, employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.

(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party.

(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income.

(6) The sources of income of both parties, including, but not limited to, medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.

(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preservation, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribution of a party as homemaker.

(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.

(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.

(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property is to become effective.

(10.1) The Federal, State and local tax ramifications associated with each asset to be divided, distributed or assigned, which ramifications need not be immediate and certain.

(10.2) The expense of sale, transfer or liquidation associated with a particular asset, which expense need not be immediate and certain.

(11) Whether the party will be serving as the custodian of any dependent minor children.

23 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a).

 

 

Obtaining an Order for Protection from Abuse as a man can be daunting – but it can be accomplished.  In C. R. v. S. L. P., 2017 Pa. Super. Unsub. LEXIS 2614, *1-2 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 11, 2017) the trial court summarized the facts as follows:

The party’s custody order stated that the parties exchange custody on Friday, father to pick child up at her daycare center. On July 8, 2016, the child was not at daycare and [Appellee] (the father) went to [Appellant’s] (the mother’s) home to pick up their child. This action appeared to have been done by agreement and the location of the pick-up did not seem to affect the Decision of the Court. In the Petition for the PFA, [Appellee] stated the most recent incident of abuse as follows:

“. . . I held the door open and called 911 and she kept hitting me. I bent over for a second and she punched me in my nose. My nose started bleeding and she tried to grab my arm and she bit me twice. The police arrived and she was arrested. I filed an emergency PFA this weekend.”

Also, in the Petition for the PFA, [Appellee] stated that a prior incident occurred approximately eight (8) months ago. Specifically:

“About 8 months ago during one of our exchanges at Tractor Supply, we began arguing. Appellant tried punching me and was cussing me out during the exchange. From that point on our exchanges were to be made at the daycare. We had not had any problems since we have not had to make contact for the exchanges until now.”  Trial Court Opinion,10/19/16, at 3-4

On July 11, 2016, the trial court entered a temporary PFA Order in favor of the Appellee and granted Appellee custody of the parties’ minor child.  A hearing on the final PFA was held on July 25, 2016. After the hearing, the court issued a permanent PFA in favor of Appellee. C. R. v. S. L. P., 2017 Pa. Super. Unsub. LEXIS 2614, *1-2 (Pa. Super. Ct. July 11, 2017)  The wife appealed the Court order.

The PFA Act defines “abuse” as one or more of the following:

(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a deadly weapon.

(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury. 23 Ph.Cs. §6102(a).

The wife argued that the trial court erred in relying on the father’s testimony.  Wife’s underlying assertion was that the husband was the aggressor and she was merely defending herself. This Court deferred to the trial court’s determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses. Thompson, 963 A.2d at 477.

The Court noted that a PFA petitioner is not required to file a police report, nor was it necessary for the father to introduce medical evidence of an injury. The petitioner’s testimony is sufficient if it is believed by the trial court. Custer v. Cochran, 2007 PA Super 290, 933 A.2d 1050, 1058 (Pa. Super. 2007).

The takeaway here is that violent actions by a wife or mother can result in a legitimate PFA attempt and simply the testimony of the father, if found credible regarding violent events can result in a PFA.

The factors to be considered in determining whether to grant a proposed relocation are as follows:

(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of the child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and with the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant persons in the child’s life.

(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the likely impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, educational and emotional development, taking into consideration any special needs of the child.

(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody arrangements, considering the logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.

(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age and maturity of the child.

(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of either party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the other party.

(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or opposing the relocation.

(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member of the party’s household and whether there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party.

(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h).

When a child has continued to reside for many years in the same location the Court may view this situation as controlling.

The removal of a young child from his environment is a factor which bears on its emotional well-being. Therefore, continued residence of children with one parent may be controlling.

The children for most of their lives, and for most of the time since the parties separated, were under the mother’s care. The original Court interviewed the children and the Court was impressed with them. The Court stated: “They are both charming and lovable children.” (N.T. 4-66).  The Court stated that they were likewise comfortable with the parenting skills and demeanor of the father.  However, the Court felt that since the children were clearly benefitting from a living arrangement that had become their usual practice, that changing it made no sense.  The Court seemingly felt that there was no reason to change a good thing.  The lower Court discussed at length the arguments of the father and did not discount them, they simply felt that a long term living arrangement had already been reached and that none of the arguments provided by the father were strong enough to change a situation that so obviously benefitted the children.

This court has long recognized that the removal of a young child from his environment is a factor which bears on its emotional well-being. In re Custody of Phillips, 260 Pa.Superior Ct. 402, 408, 394 A.2d 989, 992 (1978), Commonwealth ex rel. Children’s Aid Society v. Gard, 362 Pa. 85, 97, 66 A.2d 300, 306 (1949). Therefore, continued residence of children with one parent may be controlling. Commonwealth ex rel. Children’s Aid Society v. Gard, supra; Commonwealth ex rel. Cutler v. Cutler, 246 Pa.Superior Ct. 82, 88, 369 A.2d 821, 824 (1977).  Commonwealth ex rel. Kraus v. Kraus, 185 Pa.Superior Ct. 167, 138 A.2d 225 (1958).

The take away here is that clearly as is always the case, the best interests of the children are the lodestone of any decision.  Moreover, if a living arrangement has been reached that clearly results in the children thriving, the Court is loath to make changes, especially if those changes could result in a potential negative result for the children.   Establishing beneficial patterns is important.

 

 

 

Once it is over it is over.  In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, once a final Divorce Decree has been issued, unless there was a failure to disclose information or assets or some other equally fraudulent action during the equitable distribution, the Decree is completely final and cannot be revisited. 

The Pennsylvania Divorce Code makes no provision for a “modification” of a final decree of equitable distribution, and in fact it is settled law that such a decree is non-modifiable. The Code provides, however, that the Courts shall have original jurisdiction in cases of divorce and shall determine, in conjunction with any decree granting a divorce the following matters, if raised in the pleadings, and issue appropriate decrees or orders with reference thereto, and may retain continuing jurisdiction thereof: (1) the determination and disposition of property rights and interests between spouses. 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a)(1).  Freeman v. Powers, 2010 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 691, *1 (Pa. County Ct. Nov. 23, 2010)

Religion can be an issue with divorced spouses of differing faiths.  Interfaith marriage is more and more common and thus interfaith divorces strain the party’s decision making regarding the religious upbringing of the children during divorce.  At times, the decision a married couple makes about exposing children to religion changes after the divorce process.  Sadly, but not unexpectedly, the exposure of children to various religions can cause passionate and righteous disagreement between the divorced parties.

In the Commonwealth Zummo v. Zummo, 394 Pa. Super. 30, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. 1990) has been the lodestone of the Court’s determinations regarding religious differences.

The facts of Zummo, elucidate the problem of religious differences in divorce but highlight the rule that both parties should be allowed to expose their children to various religious faiths. The children’s mother was Jewish and the father was Catholic, and at the time of the divorce, the children were eight, four, and three years’ old. During the marriage, the family participated fully in Judaism by agreement.  The father was not particularly observant regarding his Catholicism and the children were not exposed to it in any way.

When the parents separated, the father stopped bringing the oldest child to religious school during his custodial time (the other two children were not yet old enough to start). The parents asked the trial court to determine how much Jewish religious school the child was obligated to attend during his custody.  The trial court held that Father must take the children to religious school even during his periods of partial custody and prohibited the father from bringing the child to Catholic services.

The Court held “that each parent must be free to provide religious exposure and instruction, as that parent sees fit, during any and all period of legal custody or visitation without restriction, unless the challenged beliefs or conduct of the parent are demonstrated to present a substantial threat of present or future, physical or emotional harm to the child in absence of the proposed restriction. This standard requires proof of a ‘substantial threat’ rather than ‘some probability.” This Court noted further that “while the harm involved may be present or future harm, the speculative possibility of mere disquietude, disorientation, or confusion arising from exposure to ‘contradictory’ religions would be a patently insufficient ’emotional harm’ to justify encroachment by the government upon constitutional parental and religious rights of parents, even in the context of divorce. Thus, in Zummo the Court ruled that a parent can-not be prohibited from exposing children to the various religions of the parents.[1]

 

[1] Parts of this article refer to the P.J.A. v. H.C.N., 2016 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 511, *22-25, 141 A.3d 598, 2016 WL 661752 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 18, 2016) Decision.

 

In Grace v. Wood, 1982 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 7, *1, 39 Pa. D. & C.3d 72, 72 (Pa. C.P. Jan. 21, 1982) the Courts were confronted with the decision of whether to award joint custody.  Both parents had remarried and ended up living within three miles of each other.  At some point the father had relinquished physical custody of the two minor children as he worked out of the country.  He returned and remarried and began living close to the mother of the children.  The mother had also remarried. 

The children were interviewed and it was determined that both children had warm relationships with both parents, their step-parents and their step-siblings.  The Court stated: “The overriding issue before us is whether the children’s best interests will be served by their legally being placed under joint custody of both the natural father and mother, rather than remaining under the sole custody of the mother. We have concluded that the children’s interests will be so served.”

The Court also stated that the fundamental principle, now firmly entranced in the law of this Commonwealth, is that our polestar is the best interests and welfare of the children. Com. ex. rel. Spriggs v. Carson, 470 Pa. 290, 368 A.2d 635 (1977); Com. ex rel. Parikh v. Parikh, 449 Pa. 105, 296 A.2d 625 (1972); Wenger v. Wenger, 267 Pa. Super. 134, 406 A.2d 555 (1979); Com. ex rel. Grillo v. Schuster, 226 Pa. Super. 29, 312 A.2d 58 (1973).

The major question before the court was not the determination of how much time the children were to spend with each parent, but instead the rights to make major life decisions for the minor children.  Reading between the lines here, the father and mother did not agree on the schooling issues and other life decisions confronting the children. The Court felt both parents were warm and loving.  The Court relied on logic from an out of state court – The Missouri Court of Appeals in Lewis v. Lewis, 301 S. W. 2d 861, at 863 (Mo. App. 1957):

“Where the father and mother were proper persons, both are not only entitled to reasonable access to their children, but the best interests of the children will in fact be served by an arrangement where they may associate with both parents … it can hardly be denied that the boys, having reached the ages of eight and 10 years, stand in a position where they need guidance, supervision and love and affection of their father as well as their mother.”

The Court observed the father and was impressed by his love and interest in the children – which they found was an important positive factor in the custody ruling.  Moreover, the children also indicated to the Court that they wanted to spend time with their father.  The boys had already had alternating physical custody and seemed to handle the situation well – likely influenced by the parent’s proximity.  This preference was also an important factor.  In re Snellgrose, 432 Pa. 158, 247 A.2d 598 (1968); Carlisle Appeal, 225 Pa. Super. 181, 510 A.2d 280 (1973); compare Com. v. Hickey, 213 Pa. Super. 349, 242 A.2d 806 (1968).  The Court also noted that the joint custody arrangement also was minimally disruptive to the lives of the children. 

The Court stated that: “We believe the benefits to the children of having their parents share responsibility for major decisions outweighs the detriments. We expressly disapprove of the common situation where the noncustodial parent is ousted from the child’s life, and barred from the decision-making process. Being the custodial parent in no way accords the right to have the other parent kept in the dark. If a sole custodial parent has the ultimate authority, possessing the power and the legal right to decide, then it inexorably follows that the noncustodial parent’s beliefs are capable of utter disregard. Such result we here seek to avoid, for we believe it not in the best interests of the children to have one parent so powerless. In expressing such general disapprobation, we do not suggest that Sara has so excluded Brewster; rather, this must not happen in the future.”

Moreover, the Court noted:  “Sole custody tends both to isolate children from the noncustodial parent and to place heavy financial and emotional burdens on the sole caretaker… see Bratt [Joint Custody], 67 Ky. L.J. at 275; Miller, Joint Custody 13 Fam. L.W. 345, 354-57 (1979) … Moreover, because of the absolute nature of sole-custody determinations, in which one parent ‘wins’ and the other ‘loses’, the children are likely to become the subject of bitter custody contests and post-decree tension. Id. at 355. The upshot is that the best interests of the child are disserved by many aspects of sole custody.”

Thus, the Court determined that joint custody was not only better for the children – but it was also beneficial considering the circumstances. 

The takeaway here is that being a good parent and providing a good household environment is a lodestone in custody determinations and further that in general Courts will likely prefer arrangements that empower parents equally in custodial and decision-making circumstances.