Author: bretrgoldstein@gmail.com

One of the issues that married spouses who own their home confront in a divorce is who lives in the house during the divorce process.  In the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania one or both of the parties can file a Petition for Special Relief asking for sole possession of the family home.  The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 23 Pa. C.S. § 3502(c) gives a Judge the right to award a party the home during the divorce.  Laczkowski v. Laczkowski, 344 Pa. Super. 154 (Pa. Super. 1985) is the seminal case in this regard.  The facts of the case are as follows.  The mother and father lived in the marital residence and sadly, entered the divorce process.  They had one minor child.  After the filing of the divorce, the relationship of the parties degenerated to the extent that the mother and daughter moved out of the home and into the maternal parents’ home.  The mother then filed a Petition for Special Relief in order to get sole possession of the home during the divorce.  The Court awarded the mother the home. 

The Court used the following factors to make this determination.  First, there was testimony that the father was both physically and emotionally abusive during the period that both parties lived in the home.  This drove the mother and daughter out of the home.  Second the father had the financial capacity to find himself an alternate residence.  Clearly the father was better able to move into another abode.  Third, the child had significant attachments to the locale and the home.  She did not want to move into a different school or have her life change, yet she did not want to remain in the home with the father.  So, the Court clearly took the child’s interests into account in making the determination.  There is a sense from reading the Decision that the Court found that the best interests of the minor child the most important factor in making its determination.

It should be noted that the Court that made the determination indicated that this sort of award that it was loathe to make and there are other cases where the Court did not award the house to either party.  That being said (1) economic factors; (2) minor children and (3) emotional and physical abuse are the major factors in making a determination on this issue.

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Certainly, having a criminal record can have a negative effect upon litigation of custody issues in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  A conviction, especially of a child related or violent offense could potentially sway a Judge in terms of a custody factor thus swaying the entire litigation.  Likewise, Protection from Abuse (PFA) Orders are often used during divorces as tactical moves to evict a party to the divorce from a home in order to influence custody or attempt to gain control of the home and its contents.   Some divorce counsel often use PFA’s unscrupulously in order to gain leverage during a divorce. 

G.P.M. v. A.M.F., 2018 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4890 (2018), stands for the proposition that the record of a Temporary PFA that has been raised in a custody or divorce action, can be blocked from public view and can be eliminated as evidence. In G.P.M. Supra. the mother who was the party to the action in custody, filed a PFA and obtained a Temporary Protection from Abuse (TPFA) Order from the Court based upon the allegations made at the time she applied for the PFA.  The PFA was eventually dismissed and never became a permanent Order. 

The Father later filed a Petition for Special Relief which demanded expungement of the record of the TPFA.  The Court granted this motion and directed that the TPFA be expunged.  The Court further directed that the entry of the TPFA be blocked from public view. 

A custody action was commenced by the father and in the mother’s response her pleadings specifically referred to the TPFA and attached the original TPFA order as an exhibit.  The father upon receipt of the response filed another pleading indicating that the mother had violated the expungement order which not only put into evidence an expunged matter but also jeopardized the father’s employment with the Department of Defense clearances which were mandatory for his employment.  He asked the Court to prevent the mother from using the order as an exhibit and to direct the department of records to block the TPFA order from any public view.  The Court denied the father’s request indicating that the expungement order was enough and noting that it was a waste of judicial resources to make changes to the pleadings in order to eliminate all references to the TPFA.

The father appealed this determination and the appellate Court was compelled to evaluate the common law right of openness in pleadings with the prejudice done to the father. The Court determined that the case presented a situation in which a party’s interest in his reputation defeated the common law right of access to inspection of judicial records. When, as here, the parties in a custody proceeding stipulate to declare a TPFA order null and void, the target of the TPFA order is entitled to expungement of the order. Carlacci v. Mazaleski, 568 Pa. 471, 798 A.2d 186, 190-91 (Pa. 2002). The purpose of expungement is to protect his reputation, id. at 189, as well as the loss of employment, housing or education that may accompany a record of domestic violence. Cf. Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 495 Pa. 506, 434 A.2d 1205, 1207 (Pa. 1981).  Using the TPFA order as an exhibit defeats the purposes of expungement.   The exhibit potentially smears the father’s reputation and jeopardizes his employment, housing and educational prospects.

The mother was instructed to refrain from any further references to the TPFA order or inclusion of the order as an exhibit to pleadings or motions.  In addition, the appellate Court indicated that the trial Court should immediately direct removal of all existing references to the TPFA order, either in the body of pleadings or as exhibits, from the record. Permitting these references to remain available for public view frustrates the purpose of expungement by harming Father’s reputation and other interests, particularly his DOD clearances.

So, as a practical matter if you are the victim of a TPFA order that was dismissed or expunged, you should request that all references to it be immediately eliminated from any pleadings or argument in your current custody issue.  Please note however that this case will help you – but is not controlling on this issue.  Moreover, one important fact here is that the father had security clearance issues which could be caused by the trial Court’s failure to completely wipe the record clean of the TPFA.

Obeying a Court’s Order directing drug testing is extremely important in order to maintain or advance custody.  This is particularly true if the parent in question has had issues with substance abuse and legal problems caused by this situation.  In M.L.G. v. L.M.G., 2019 Pa. Super. Unsub. LEXIS 32, 2019 WL 101035, the father had substance abuse issues.  The Court ordered the father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5329 to undergo a drug test.  On two separate occasions the father was directed by the Court to undergo drug testing.  However, on all these occasions, the father failed to submit to a hair follicle drug test at his own expense.   Due to these repeated failures to undergo testing the Court payed hardball with the father and issued the following Order:

“The Court continues to be concerned that Father has continued to disregard this Court’s previous orders of October and November directing that he submit to a hair follicle test. Father is therefore DIRECTED and ORDERED, once again, to submit to the hair follicle test and to have the results forwarded to this Court on or before February 15, 2018. In the event that the Court does not receive any report prior to that date it shall STOP Father’s visitation with the minor child and said visitation shall only be resumed upon a receipt from the testing facility that Father has passed said test.”

The bottom line is that the Court indicated that if the Order was not obeyed, the father should lose all visitation rights regarding his child(ren).  The father appealed this order to a higher Court.

The Court upheld the trial Court’s Order and directive to attend the drug test as a precursor to obtain ongoing visitation rights.  The appeal Court indicated that pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1915.8, a trial Court may order a party to undergo any mental and physical examinations it deems fit in actions for custody or visitation, and such examinations do not violate the Fourth Amendment.  The Court referred to Luminella v. Marcocci, 2002 PA Super 410, 814 A.2d 711, 722 (Pa. Super. 2002) a mother could legally be compelled to a drug test. (It should also be noted that the father had some drug related criminal convictions as well.)

So, as a practical matter what does this decision tell us?  First, it is the smart move to submit to all Court Ordered testing.  If you are told to get a mental status exam or drug test, go get one.  Otherwise, you subject yourself to the whims of the Court in removing custodial access.  But also, what does this portend for the parent who does not have the substance abuse problem?  Clearly this case is evidence for frustration on the part of the other parent.  The father was directed no less than three times, one would assume over an extended period.  Basically, the Courts let this father get away with ignoring direct Orders for a long time before they played hardball with him.  This is something to consider.  You should keep good records.  You should make sure that the Court is notified of arrests regarding drug related crimes and bring such information immediately to the attention of your counsel. Most of all know that the wheels of justice grind slowly if you are the victim. f

One of the interesting questions regarding custody is the effect that a criminal conviction has on the Court’s determination regarding custody.  As a practical matter, how much does a criminal conviction injure a parent’s attempt to regain or preserve their custody of a child or children?  While certainly crimes of physical or sexual abuse will be regarded as potentially disqualifying factors with regard to custody, Courts have indicated that poor decision making leading to convictions or even crimen falsi crimes do not act to disqualify a parent from obtaining custody or even becoming the primary parent.  It appears that a Court’s perception of the credibility of a parent is primary.   That determination if well founded will overcome criminal behavior even against an appeal. 

L.E.S. v. W.C.D., 2019 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 141 is supportive of this premise.  In L.E.S. parents divorced and fought over custody of their child.  In a previous custody trial, the Court determined that the mother had left the child alone in her home in order to go to a bar to drink alcohol and that this action also resulted in a DUI conviction.  Moreover, the Mother was determined to be bipolar and further had been convicted of credit card fraud as well.  During this litigation the father had been awarded primary physical and legal custody. 

However, the mother later challenged this custody arrangement.  She convinced a Court that she had ceased drinking alcohol.  Moreover, she had obtained treatment for her bipolar disorder and proved that she saw her psychiatrist monthly and her psychologist every two weeks.  She also proved that she had engaged in parenting duties and carried them out competently.  The father indicated that mother was not stable and has psychological issues and of course raised the specter of the past fraud and DUI convictions.  However, the mother’s testimony carried significant weight with the Court.  It indicated the following about the father’s attitude evident at the custody trial. 

“It appears from the totality of the evidence that Father does not see Mother as a priority as to the Child based upon the past behavior regarding the crime for which . . . she has been convicted. And he seems to feel that he is in charge, over Mother, in regard to the Child. This is reflective in the way he talks about her, the way he says that the Child needs to get back for something instead of being with Mother, as if . . . whatever he has to get back for something that is more important that the Child’s relationship with his Mother. Father seems to have concluded that Mother is a second-class parent by virtue of her DUI and is going to ride that for all its worth and that Mother can never redeem herself.” L.E.S. Supra.

The Court recognized the mother’s past errors but based upon her testimony, demeanor and her behavior as a mother during the intervening two years the Court did not place strong evidentiary weight on her past misdeeds.  The Court noted that based upon this past malfeasance the Court would be entirely appropriately entitled to discount her testimony.  However, despite this the Court found the mother credible and indicated that the past convictions were not enough to warrant a finding of a current lack of credibility.  The Court seemingly felt that the mother had to a great extent redeemed herself and should not be judged by her past misdeeds. 

The Court stated: “However, query: does that incident mean that Mother can never have primary custody of the Child ever again? Was that the first domino that knocks all of the other dominos over for the rest of the Child’s life and her life? It appears that she has rehabilitated herself; there is no evidence that she had any additional criminal problems since then and has demonstrated good stability since then. She is currently in a relationship, she has a productive job making good money, she has the support of her mother, who lives nearby.”  L.E.S., Supra.

The Court explicitly indicates that past misdeeds and convictions as well as past high-risk behavior will not necessarily prevent an individual from obtaining majority legal and physical custody in a custody action.  The totality of circumstances will determine the result. 

I wanted to write about this case J.S. v. R.S.S., 2018 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 218, because it is so scandalous that it deserved a post all on its own.  The case is predominantly about how the Court applied the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act. 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5401-5482. The short form is that the father was a Hungarian and met and married an American woman and had children.  The father then took one of the children and concocted a story in order to keep the custody of the child away from the mother.  When the mother finally tired of the story and missed her child, the Father indicated that the custodial battle should occur in Hungary not Pennsylvania and the Court disagreed.  The father appealed. 

The parties got married in 2008 and eventually separated in 2014.  During the marriage they had one child.  In 2015 the father filed a Complaint in Custody and filed a Notice of Intent to return to Hungary. At a custody conference the parties agreed that the father would have primary and sole legal and physical custody of the child and agreed that the father and daughter could live in Hungary.  In 2017 the mother filed a Petition to obtain more custody.   Mother asserted that following entry of the custody order, and despite the previously agreed upon order, the Mother exercised primary physical custody of the Child, who resided with her at the parties’ former marital home in Hummelstown. Mother asserted that Father never relocated to Hungary and that the Child continuously resided in Pennsylvania through the date of her petitions.  Mother claimed that following entry of the August 2015 custody order, she exercised physical custody for the next year or so but as time went on, the Child spent less time with her and began to reside with Father.  Mother claimed that she repeatedly asked Father to return the Child and that he would promise her he would do so, but never did. Father then told her that he and the Child were in a witness protection program and he could not disclose the Child’s whereabouts. Father eventually cut off Mother from any contact with the Child, sometime in July 2016, which was the last time she saw the Child.   The mother indicated that she had agreed to the father having full custody because he had spun her a yarn indicating that he and the child were in a witness protection program and he told her that he and the child were in danger. 

In December 2015, while Mother and Father were still in a relationship and unbeknownst to Mother, Father married his new wife E.S. in the United States. Mother would not discover this marriage until November 2016 when their wedding announcement was published in a local paper.  E.S., who is Hungarian, had been living in the U.S. for a short time on a work visa. She and Mother lived together briefly in the farmhouse in 2015, however, their relationship deteriorated and in April 2015 E.S. filed a Protection From Abuse (PFA) petition against Mother, with whom she claimed to have been sexually intimate. The same day, Mother filed a PFA petition against Father, reciting incidents of physical and emotional abuse. Less than two weeks after filing their actions, both E.S. and Mother withdrew their respective PFA petitions.

Mother eventually figured out about the marriage and left what had been the marital home and filed for custody.  The Court determined that Pennsylvania maintains jurisdiction under the first prong if there existed a significant connection between the Child and Mother as of November 2017, when Mother filed her custody modification petition. A significant relationship is established where one parent resides and exercises [her] parenting time in [Pennsylvania] and maintains a meaningful relationship with the child.  The Court also determined that the Father had manipulated and defrauded the mother who without the fraud would have continued to have a relationship and parental presence regarding the child.  The Court called the Father deceitful.

The court found that Pennsylvania had jurisdiction.  Moreover, the father had indicated that Hungary would be a more convenient forum.  The court weighed the factors regarding determining the most convenient forum and indicated that Pennsylvania was the most convenient.  Although the Court discussed each of the factors it appeared to weigh the fact that Mother did not have the means to fight the case in Hungary nor could she speak the language or easily travel to Europe. 

The bottom line here is lying doesn’t help when it comes to custody.  Moreover, the Court will not easily give up jurisdiction regarding a hearing for custody in Pennsylvania. 

 

 

 

During the case the father indicated that he did not tell the mother where he was and allowed her to believe the story because he was afraid of her.  He indicated that the mother had tried to kill him on two occasions.  Father maintained business connections to Central Pennsylvania. He remained a silent partner in a Pennsylvania business.

 

 

 

 

 

 

On May 4, 2018 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Legislature passed Act 21 which was signed into law by Governor Wolf and which was to take effect in sixty days from approval.  The statute reads as follows:

Section 5324 of Title 23 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes is amended by adding paragraphs to read:

• 5324. Standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody.

The following individuals may file an action under this chapter for any form of physical custody or legal custody:

* * *

(4)  Subject to paragraph (5), an individual who establishes by clear and convincing evidence all of the following:

(i)  The individual has assumed or is willing to assume responsibility for the child.

(ii)  The individual has a sustained, substantial and sincere interest in the welfare of the child. In determining whether the individual meets the requirements of this subparagraph, the court may consider, among other factors, the nature, quality, extent and length of the involvement by the individual in the child’s life.

(iii)  Neither parent has any form of care and control of the child.

(5)  Paragraph (4) shall not apply if:

(i)  a dependency proceeding involving the child has been initiated or is ongoing; or

(ii)  there is an order of permanent legal custody under 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351(a)(2.1) or (f.1)(3) (relating to disposition of dependent child).

Section 2.  Sections 5325(2) and 5329(a) introductory paragraph of Title 23 are amended to read:

• 5325. Standing for partial physical custody and supervised physical custody.

In addition to situations set forth in section 5324 (relating to standing for any form of physical custody or legal custody), grandparents and great-grandparents may file an action under this chapter for partial physical custody or supervised physical custody in the following situations:

* * *

(2)  where the relationship with the child began either with the consent of a parent of the child or under a court order and where the parents of the child [have been separated for a period of at least six months or]:

(i)  have commenced [and continued] a proceeding [to dissolve their marriage] for custody; and

(ii)  do not agree as to whether the grandparents or great-grandparents should have custody under this section; or

* * *

• 5329. Consideration of criminal conviction.

(a)  Offenses.–Where a party seeks any form of custody, the court shall consider whether that party or member of that party’s household has been convicted of or has pleaded guilty or no contest to any of the offenses in this section or an offense in another jurisdiction substantially equivalent to any of the offenses in this section. The court shall consider such conduct and determine that the party does not pose a threat of harm to the child before making any order of custody to that [parent] party when considering the following offenses:

* * *

Section 3.  The addition of 23 Pa.C.S. § 5324(4) and (5) shall apply to all custody proceedings irrespective of whether the proceeding was commenced before, on or after the effective date of this section.

Section 4.  This act shall take effect in 60 days.

So, what does this legalese actually mean?

First, it gives standing to non-blood related / non-relative individuals who love and care for children.  This is a huge step forward as it serves to put children in the legal care of those individuals who have established a pattern of love and caring for the child.   This does not exclude relatives of children who have parents that are out of the picture for some reason – but it gives standing to individuals who are willing to invest in children in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.

Second, it gives standing to grandparents and great grandparents who want partial physical custody or supervised custody.  This is also a win for children and those who are willing to invest in their care.   Clearly this situation is a common one in the Commonwealth.  Typically, there is a divorce and / or separation and one of the divorcing parties wants to prevent access to the children by the grandparents or great grandparents.  This allows the great grandparent or grandparent to establish a right to access to their grandchildren by Court Order.

Third, the Act makes it a Court duty to review criminal convictions of a potential custody seeker in order to conclude, before making a custody decision, that the environment is a safe one for children.   This seeks to attempt to avoid the tragedies that have recently occurred with an unstable parent injuring or murdering their children.   Thus, a Court must make a finding about the safety of an environment before concluding that a child should be put into that environment.

 

When attempting to obtain an Order for Protection from Abuse (PFA) a history of abuse is relevant to the trial Court and is potentially admissible.  In Wippel v. Wippel, 25 Phila. 587, 587, 1992 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 135, 1992 WL 1071456, the trial Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of certain prior incidents or of the existence of the two previous Orders demonstrating abuse, because they were not unduly prejudicial and were relevant to the issue of intent.  This concept is counter to the typical evidentiary admissibility of prior bad acts in Court.   In most situations this sort of evidence is inadmissible.  However, in the case of proving abuse, fear of abuse and harm when attempting to obtain a PFA, this evidence is in some cases admissible.  While the Court did not expressly indicate this was a reason for their determination – a victim’s fear of harm and abuse is a state of mind which must be “reasonable.”  Past occasions of physical or verbal abuse are potentially evidence of a victim’s reasonableness in proving that they felt threatened with harm.  If beaten or abused in the past, a victim can logically expect that such behavior would have a higher propensity to reoccur in the future.

Prior bad acts typically cannot be admitted proving the likelihood of a negative action – in this case violence and verbal abuse.  Prior bad acts also cannot be used as circumstantial evidence of conduct.  The bottom line is that the perpetrator of the abuse cannot have his or her past behavior used against him or her to prove a current abusive action.  However, the Wippel Court noted that such evidence can be used under other circumstances.

In Wipple, Supra. the victim presented two prior Court Orders demonstrating past incidents of proven abuse.  These Orders were admitted showing the victim’s state of mind.  Thus, such evidence went to the reasonableness standard to meet the burden of proving reasonable fear of harm and abuse.   The appellate Court found the admission of these orders to be not prejudicial enough to overturn the trial Court’s Decision and noted that the Orders were clearly relevant.   The trial Court felt that the Orders helped demonstrate the perpetrator’s intent to threaten the victim.

Where intent is at issue and the prior activity is similar in nature, evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is admissible. See Commonwealth v. Eddowes, 397 Pa.Super. 551, 580 A.2d 769 (1990); Commonwealth v. Bond, 261 Pa.Super. 311, 396 A.2d 414 (1978).   The perpetrator in this case indicated that he did not have the adequate intent to threaten the victim and thus this evidence as to intent became relevant and admissible.

The takeaway here is that a pattern of abusive behavior can be admissible in current litigation and the trial Court in PFA situations is liable to admit at least documentary evidence of such prior bad acts to prove current intent and the reasonableness of the victim’s fear of abuse.

 

Threats alone are not typically enough to warrant the issuance of a Protection from Abuse Order (PFA).  There must be either a history of provable physical abuse or an immanent fear of harm.   In Realmuto v. Regalbuto, 2014 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 3085, the parties were in the middle of a contentious divorce.  The wife retained possession of the marital home.  The husband contacted the wife in order to obtain possessions from inside the home and during the telephone call became angry and stated: “I should have beat [you] during [our] marriage, and I want to punch you in your mouth.”  The wife thereafter filed for a PFA.  The trial Court determined that this statement alone was not enough to meet the burden under the PFA statute in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 

23 Pa. C.S. §6102(a)(2) requires that the perpetrator of the abusive act muse place the victim in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.  The Court focused on the reasonable fear of serious bodily injury in the case.  They remarked that the husband made his remarks over the phone – so there was distance between them – which made the alleged threat one that was not imminent.  Further the husband had made the statements in anger – with no history of any violent behavior against the wife.  In fact, there was no record of the husband ever making any threats of violent behavior during the marriage or separation.  The lack of reasonableness of wife’s fear was enhanced by the fact that after the alleged threats, the husband had left the home and had not contacted the wife again.  Given these circumstances the court found that the wife could not reasonably have believed that she was in imminent danger of harm.  Thus, her petition for PFA was dismissed by the trial court. 

The take away here is that simple threats without physical presence, actual contact and reasonable belief of immanent physical harm are necessary for a Court to award a PFA.

Orders of Protection from Abuse can not only be protective of the threatened spouse but also the children.  In K.F-M v. J.W.M., 2017 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2873,175 A.3d 421, a Fatherwho also happened to be police officer was involved in a contentious divorce with his spouse.  They had multiple children.  During the divorce both parties had major disagreements about custody and division of assets.  One of the children provided the Mother with a letter indicating that the Father had sexually abused the child.  The Mother immediately moved to obtain a PFA against the Father alleging abuse and the original trial Court awarded the PFA against the Father with regard to all of the children, not simply the one who had accused the Father of abuse.  The Father appealed this determination and felt that the Court had abused discretion when it had awarded the PFA against all of the Father’s children.

The appellate Court determined that the trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded the PFA and gave custody of all of the children to the Mother.  The Court indicated that the evidence that the Father had abused one child was convincing enough evidence to make the PFA apply to all children  See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6108(a)(4)(i)(A). The appellate Court indicated that within a dependency context, that “it may be that a family member who perpetrates sexual abuse on one child is likely to abuse another child, either sexually or otherwise.” In re M.W., 2004 PA Super 15, 842 A.2d 425, 428-29 (Pa. Super. 2004); see also In re S.B., 2003 PA Super 286, 833 A.2d 1116, 1122-23 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 579 Pa. 693, 856 A.2d 835 (Pa. 2004); In Interest of Y.P., 353 Pa. Super. 185, 509 A.2d 397, 399 (Pa. Super. 1986) (finding that where one sibling was sexually abused, protection of the other sibling could not be achieved in the abuser’s custody). The appellate Court felt that previous concerns regarding the safety of the children warranted a PFA.

The takeaway here is that evidence of abuse that a Court finds credible regarding children will likely result in a PFA against the alleged perpetrator.

 

Protection from abuse (PFA) orders are sadly part of many divorce situations.  Typically, we advise our clients to only use them as an action of last resort, when there is real fear of abuse and a history of threats and violence in the marriage.  Often, they are used by one party to try to prevent another party’s occupation of the marital home/domicile.  However, if there is no real evidence of threats or abuse the PFA will not hold up and you will have damaged your credibility in front of your spouse, the opposing counsel (and perhaps your own counsel) and most importantly, the jurists who will be deciding the facts of your case. 

A PFA is supposed to prevent one party from engaging in “abuse” of another party.  The statute specifically defines abuse as:

“The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological parenthood:

(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a deadly weapon.

(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.

(3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant to 18 Ph.C.’s. § 2903 (relating to false imprisonment).

(4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children, including such terms as defined in Chapter 63 (relating to child protective services).

(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including following the person, without proper authority, under circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. The definition of this paragraph applies only to proceedings commenced under this title and is inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions commenced under Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses).” 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102

When a finding of abuse is made by a Court, the Court may grant any protection order or approve any consent agreement to bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children.  23 Pa.C.S. § 6108.   Typically, it is easier for a woman to obtain a PFA than a man – but Courts are becoming more egalitarian in how they enforce such orders. 

We will cover the fact situations of what can constitute abuse as a practical matter in future posts.